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Extractive Versus Productive Economy: A Case 
Study Comparison of Peru and South Korea 
Ruben Berrios 
There are striking contrasts between a productive and an extractive economy. South 
Korea and Peru are used as examples. Korea is not a resource-rich country but has de-
veloped remarkably fast. Pem, on the other hand, is a resource-rich country but has 
shown uneven rates of growth and has had a lackluster development performance be-
cause it has relied on extractive industries that have brought boom and bust. Korea is a 
high performing economy that achieved high rates of growth implementing policies 
that emphasized productivity and promoted industrialization and free trade. Korea's 
success is explained in terms of its policies promoting the growth of private manufac-
turing industries, technological planning, strong support for education, investment ini-
tiatives, and socio-cultural factors. Peru, on the other hand, still suffers from structural 
weaknesses . This article calls for Peru to put in place a viable development model, in-
vest in human capital , industrial development, and promote nontraditional exports. 
A priority of development is to promote sustained economic growth, achieve prosperi-
ty, and compete internationally. Many studies have shown that the best tool to combat 
poverty is to accelerate economic growth. Countries with positive income growth have 
experienced a decline in the proportion of people living in poverty. It is estimated that 
on average, with a 1% increase in GDP per capita, poverty is reduced by 7%. This 
paper argues that there are striking contrasts between a productive economy and an 
extractive economy. Some Asian countries such as the Republic of Korea (commonly 
known as South Korea) are not resource-rich countries but have developed remarkably 
fast. Peru, on the other hand, is a resource-rich country but has shown uneven rates of 
growth and has stagnated in its development efforts. This case study comparison of 
Peru and Korea attempts to show how the former has lagged behind while the latter has 
achieved rapid progress toward development. 
South Korea is chosen as an example of a productive economy and Peru as an 
example of an extractive economy. Both countries share some broad common features 
but have followed different trajectories of development. The central argument is that 
Peru has had a lackluster development performance because it has relied on extractive 
industries that have generated insufficient employment and sluggish growth. Its devel-
opment policies were often ineffective. Meanwhile Korea became a high performing 
economy that achieved high rates of growth by implementing the right policies that 
emphasized increases in productivity and promoted an outward-orientation to industri-
alization and trade. 
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Two Paths Taken 
Figure 1 shows the starting point of comparison between the countries based on GDP 
per capita since 1960. The initial conditions defined broadly (including per capita in-
come levels and other quantitative characteristics) were similar, but they pursued 
somewhat different policies and achieved different economic outcomes. The figure 
shows that in 1960 Peru 's GDP per capita was actually higher than Korea's. The latter 
was able to catch up by 1970. Korea 's GDP per capita shows a steep upward trend 
while Peru 's GDP per capita growth has remained flat for the past four decades. In a 
matter of 20 years Korea had surpassed not only Peru but the rest of Latin America. 
Figure 1: GDP Per Capita of Peru and Korea (Constant 2000 US$ 
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Peru 's overall performance since the 1960s has been less dynamic and somewhat 
uneven. Per capita income growth remained relatively flat. During the 1980s Peru 
experienced the "lost decade" due to high levels of foreign debt and low levels of 
growth. However, in the period from 1960 to 1999, Korea had moved from being an 
agricultural nation to becoming a prominent new industrializing country (NIC). By the 
year 2000, Korea was ranked 12th in the world economy in terms ofGDP. The contrast 
can be seen using the most common measures for income and output comparisons, the 
GDP, including average annual growth, GDP per capita, and GDP per capita growth. 
Countries with a high GDP per capita have a lot of physical and human capital that is 
organized using technological knowledge to be more productive. "High quality 
growth" can be defined as growth that is sustainable, brings lasting gains in employ-
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ment and living standards, and reduces poverty. This has been achieved by Korea but 
not so much for Peru. These comparative figures are evident in Table I 
Table 1: Basic Economic Indicators 
GDP US$ Average Popu- Popula- GNP GDP GDP 
(millions) Annual lation tion Per Per per 
Growth (millions) Growth capita capita capi ta 
(%) growth 
1970 20 11 1990 2010 20 11 80- 2000- 2009 2010 2000-
99 09 09 
KOREA 252,622 1, 11 6,247 9.4 6.2 48.4 1.5 0.3 27, 100 29,004 3.8 
PERU 32,802 176,662 -0.3 8.8 29.4 2.0 1. 1 8,629 9,538 4.1 
Sources: UNDP, Human Development Report, various years; UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 
various years; The World Bank, 2012 
The argument that reliance on extractive industries is not necessarily conducive to 
economic growth has been made previously. Research on the subject has stressed that 
on average resource-rich countries have slower growth (Sachs & Warner, 1995, 2001; 
Auty, 2001). However, research by Davis (2009) and other studies show that the evi-
dence is mixed regarding the relationship between the extractive intensity of economic 
activity and the level of economic growth. Davis claims that some economies with a 
substantial extractive sector have achieved higher levels of development. However, 
there is the recognition that extractive economies suffer from the eros ion effect of 
resource wealth and the structural shift reduces manufacturing employment. 
In order to transform a developing economy, it is necessary to set up the right mix 
of institutions and policies capable of generating economic success. Korea's pragmatic 
policy approach and the ability of the government to perform institutional, technical, 
administrative, and political functions created opportunities for economic development. 
Korea was able to sustain high levels of growth, high rates of investment, macroeco-
nomic stability, an adequate regulatory system, a responsible political and entrepre-
neurial class, provide strong support for education to generate high levels of human 
capital , and incorporate technological innovation (Amsden, 1989; Breen, 1999; Koo, 
1992; Leon, 2003; Song, 1997; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). 
Also relevant for growth and development are factors such as securing private 
property rights, the degree of economic freedom and competitiveness, the degree of 
corruption, and the ease of doing business. These factors foster a better business envi-
ronment. Table 2 shows that Korea is ranked very high in terms of global competitive-
ness. Korea is also ranked much higher than Peru in terms of economic freedom be-
cause of its more inclusive economic environment. The same is true for respect of 
property rights and the ease of doing business. 
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Table 2: Comparative Business Indicators 
Competitive Economic Level of Respect of Cost of 
Environment Freedom Corruption Property Complying 
Rights with Bu-
reaucracy 
Out of 81 Out of 156 Out of 54 Out of 129 Out of 183 
countries countries countries countries countries 
KOREA 24th 31st 43rd 38th 8th 
PERU 67th 42nd 80th 76th 41st 
Sources: !.The Global Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2012; 2. The Hetitage 
Foundation, Index ofEconomic Freedom, 2012; 3. Tranparency International, Corruption Per-
ception Index, 20 12; 4. International Property Rights Index, 2012 Report; 5. The World Bank, 
Ease ofDoing Business Rank, 2012. 
Degree of Comparison 
Although Peru 's geographic area is 12 times larger than Korea's (1,285,000 sq. km. vs. 
99,000 sq. km.), the latter 's population is almost twice as large (29 million vs. 49 mil-
lion) . Historically both countries had been colonized. Peru achieved independence from 
Spain in 1823 and Korea was liberated from Japanese imperial domination in 1945. In 
terms of resource endowment, Peru is rich in minerals, agricultural production, and 
fishing resources. Its exports consist mainly of minerals, agricultural products from the 
coastal region, and fish and fish products. Korea lacks such a rich natural resource 
base, but it has more human resources than Peru. Peru is more racially diverse while 
Korea is homogeneous. Both countries have open economies and rely heavily on exter-
nal trade. Korea, however, has been more outward-oriented and has become a strong 
competitor in world markets of manufactured goods, automobiles, steel, and shipbuild-
ing. On the relative importance of the public and private sectors, Korea has a larger 
private sector. 
Both countries rapidly urbanized over the course of the past five decades. In 2010, 
72% of Peru 's population lived in urban centers while 82% of Korea's population was 
urban. In terms of occupational activity, both countries have seen the manufacturing 
and services sectors grow the fastest while the importance of agriculture as a source of 
labor has diminished. Korea rapidly accelerated the growth of manufacturing output 
and by 201 0, manufacturing accounted for 45% of GOP. The Korean economy is now 
a predominantly industrial and service-oriented economy. For Peru, the composition of 
GOP for industry was only 30% (World Bank, 2012). A significant social byproduct of 
Korea's successful development is the rise of a large middle class that is enjoying a 
newfound consumerism. The same cannot be said of Peru, where the middle class is a 
small percentage of the population. 
Both countries have also relied on foreign aid. Relative to the rest of Latin Ameri-
ca, Peru has been a large recipient of foreign development assistance from rich coun-
tries for years. Korea received generous sums of aid particularly from the United States 
during the 1960s, but for the past two decades Korea has become a foreign aid donor. 
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Interestingly enough, Korea has been providing development assistance to Peru since 
the 1990s. 
The "initial conditions" defined broadly include not only the factor endowments 
we alluded to but also the institutional and organizational factors . Both Korea and Peru 
started their post-war economic development with an inward-oriented strategy to in-
dustrialization. This is what is known as import substitution industrialization (lSI), 
which is a development strategy that governments adopted, where domestic production 
substitutes for some imported goods. lSI begins with the production of relatively sim-
ple non-durable consumer goods such as clothing, shoes, and canned goods. For the lSI 
strategy to work, the pattern of domestic production and exports must be altered and 
promoted by the state through the exclusion of foreign competition, bank credit, pref-
erential rates for essential inputs, and specific tax exemptions (Cypher and Dietz, 
2004). 
Essential Characteristics of an Extractive Economy 
Extractive economies are those that physically remove resources from their environ-
ment primarily for exporting. Although there are potential economic benefits to re-
source extraction, there are also shortcomings. For instance, mining is assumed to be a 
powerful stimulus for the economy in generating foreign exchange earnings, but it is 
also relatively unstable owing to fluctuating commodity prices, the depletion of depos-
its, the impact of global competition, and frequent labor-management disputes. For 
many years in countries like Peru and Bolivia the mining sector has been the economic 
engine driving the rest of the economy. 
Extractive industries can contribute significantly to a country ' s economic devel-
opment by generating employment, foreign exchange, and government revenues. But 
they also can become a source of rent-seeking, oan be poorly managed, and can result 
in excessive reliance on the extractive resource. In Peru's case, income resulting from 
unstable world prices has brought limited prosperity for the regions where the mines 
are located. A similar pattern is experienced in other sectors where lumber, fish, oil, 
and other commodities are exported usually raw or unfinished. The producing coun-
tries are denied the commodities' additional values, which in the end would benefit the 
core economies (Bunker, 1984; Liebenthal et a!. , 2005). However, in recent years the 
emergence of China has resulted in higher demand for commodities, which has led to a 
rise in commodity prices. 
A key feature of extractive economies is their susceptibility to external shocks. 
Unfavorable price shifts lead to uneven terms of trade. Prebisch (1950) has warned that 
the specialization in primary goods, over time, leads to a deteriorating tendency on the 
terms of trade for primary producers relative to manufactured goods produced in indus-
trialized nations. When this happens it triggers a decline in government revenues and 
the government is forced to seek foreign borrowing. Reliance on primary exports also 
makes the country more dependent because it misses the opportunity to diversify into 
more nontraditional goods with higher value added. 
Rich natural resource endowment has been a blessing for some countries and did 
translate into increased prosperity (e.g, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway). But 
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in many less developed countries (LDCs) rich in resources, it has in some cases be-
come a "curse" (Sachs & Warner, 1995; Sachs, 2005; Davis & Tilton, 2005). Empirical 
evidence suggests that on average resource-abundant economies of the less developed 
world have not performed well relative to those countries that are resource-deficient 
(Auty, 200 I) . 
Peru once had a silver and guano boom and "bonanza" development through re-
source extraction, but there has been a sequence of unsuccessful outcomes following 
every resource boom. Another case is the fishing industry (abundant in the 1950s and 
60s) which suffered a precipitous decline as a result of climate change, over-fishing, 
and government policy failures. Schuldt (2005) has noted that the country's poverty is 
the consequence of its natural wealth. This is what some scholars term the paradox of 
plenty (Karl, 1997). But this is not something that is inevitable because development 
trajectories can be altered. 
Peru has remained an extractive economy since the colonial period. The process of 
commodity extraction responded to international demand. But excessive demand at 
various points in time and a short-term profit mentality on the part of the domestic elite 
contributed to a depletion of resources. Furthermore, lack of adequate planning and 
vision distorted the structure of the economy and failed to bring about development 
(Moron & Sanborn, 2006; Schuldt, 2005). Increased dependence on export commodi-
ties has also set limitations on opportunities for technological innovation. Moreover, 
these raw commodities are likely to lose their utility when the extractive resource is 
depleted, when international demand changes, or when cheaper substitutes are found. 
This type of resource-dependent economy, also known as "enclave economy" has been 
well documented (Levin, 1960; Thorp & Bertram, 1978: Bunker, 1984). As an extrac-
tive economy, Peru 's development performance based on Human Development Index 
and other socio-economic and business indicators so far has been disappointing. 
As Bunker notes, "the crucial difference between production and extraction is that 
the dynamics of scale function inversely to the dynamics on the productive economies 
to which world trade connects them" ( 1984, p. I 056). In a productive economy the 
forces of production develop progressively because the unit cost of production tends to 
fall as the scale of production increases. However, extractive economies respond to 
increased external demand and tend to impoverish themselves by exploiting those 
resources beyond their capacity for regeneration, thereby forcing the per-unit cost of 
commodities to rise. 
While two centuries ago natural resources might have been a source of wealth, 
oday the wealth of nations comes mainly from ideas embedded in new technologies. 
Raw materials are no longer a guarantee to progress, and in fact, many cases show they 
are the road to failure. Nearly half a century ago raw materials constituted about 30% 
of the world 's total output but today it is about 4%. Much of the world economy today 
· concentrated in services and manufacturing. At present a number of LDCs are nego-
·ating free trade agreements and better commercial relations with the United States and 
Europe, but this means that these countries are investing their energy in trying to get 
tter terms on this small slice of the world economy (Oppenheimer, 2005). 
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The Development Experience 
Peru over the past half a century has expanded its exports and diversified them, but it 
remains predominantly a primary commodity exporter. Despite its resources and aid 
received, Peru failed to attain development, has witnessed many fai led projects, and 
has suffered from the symptoms of policy-induced distortions. At the end of the mi l-
lennium, 43.3% of Peru ' s exports were primary products, while Korea ' s were only 
1.3%. The expansion of Peru 's primary exports in recent years has led to higher levels 
of economic growth but with increasing inequality. 
Korea, on the other hand, was able to achieve exceptional growth and success in 
expanding manufacturing exports since the 1960s. The contrast in economic perfor-
mance between South Korea and Peru is the most glaring after the first oil shock of 
1973-74. Korea's real GDP expanded 8.9% per annum, compared to a mere 1% in 
Peru. Rapid economic growth was supported by a sharp expansion of exports that bol-
stered investment (Lin, 1988). By contrast, Peru's exports had a sluggish growth. It is 
only in recent years that Peru has posted higher levels of growth due to increased de-
mand for commodities by countries like China. On the whole, Peru has had an erratic 
path to economic development and was at times plagued by balance of payments defi-
cits, chronic inflation, and a growing foreign debt (Sheahan, 1999; Wise, 2003). 
As development strategies, import substitution and export orientation are not nec-
essarily mutually exclusive. Import substitution can be divided into an easy stage, 
where non-durable goods are produced, and a more advanced stage, where consumer 
durables and capital goods are produced. Export orientation also requ ires a stage of 
exporting manufactured products that is more labor intensive and a more advanced 
stage that requires more capital and is more technology-intensive (Chen, 1989; Cypher 
& Dietz 2004; Todaro & Smith, 2006). Korea went from the early stage of ISI to ex-
port substitution. The policy change was aimed at promoting export incentives. This 
was accomplished with the devaluation of the won, restrictions on imports, tariffs, and 
tax concessions on inputs by exporting firms, and export credit subsidies. By 1980, 
about one-third of Korea ' s exports were made up of manufactured exports. Korea was 
able to move rapidly from easy import-substitution industrialization strategy in the 
beginning of the 1960s into a stage of export substitution. Peru, on the other hand, 
became stuck at an intermediate point and faced setbacks on the more capital-intensive 
industries (Beaulne, 1975; Pease, 1981; Wise, 2003). 
Korean export expansion thrived on its industrial efficiency. Peru, on the other 
hand, lacked political continuity and the necessary policy reforms to advance industrial 
development. Korea generated an extensive system of export incentives that were 
extended over the years . Although Peru did promote nontraditional exports in the 
1970s and 80s, the incentives system was inconsistent and at times biased against 
exports. Korea's efforts were successful because once economic reforms were 
implemented they were fully supported by successive policy makers and the direction 
of reforms did not change over time. By contrast, policy reform in Peru fluctuated and 
there was a lack of consensus leading to policy shifts with subsequent administrations 
(Moron & Sanborn, 2006; Wise, 2003). 
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As a late industrializer there was not much state-sponsored industrial strategy in 
Peru until the 1960s, and this was mostly an export-supporting activity influenced by 
foreign capital. During this period Peru was a primary exporter and was in the 
consumer durable stage of lSI relying on protectionism (Beaulne, 1975). The state was 
passively involved in increasing its role in the economy. The National Planning 
Institute (INP) was created in 1962. Although Peru 's economy became increasingly 
dependent on fishmeal and copper as the biggest foreign exchange earners, the 
manufacturing sector was growing rapidly and by 1965 it came to account for 20% of 
GDP. In terms of export growth, manufacturing was only second to fishmeal. But 
behind this, the lSI drive had its classic pitfalls. For instance, over half of the output 
was under foreign control, one-fourth of it was related to the processing of primary 
products, and a significant portion of production was assembly operations for foreign 
firms (Wise, 2003). 
During the late 1960s and early '70s Peru assumed a more conscious effort to 
industrialize. The state intervened more actively in the economy. This was evident with 
the nationalization of basic industries, the creation of the Ministry of Industry, and the 
passing of the General Law oflnpustry in 1970. Although priority was given to local 
industry the state-sponsored model ran out of steam quickly. In 1975 there was a retreat 
and by 1980 the same old politicians representing the Lima elite were back in power 
promoting a variation of a more market based approach without much government 
involvement. 
In Peru, as in many countries in Latin America, protection was prolonged rather 
than phased out. Easy lSI should be seen simply as a first step on the path to industrial-
ization. But industrialization must go beyond just being internally oriented. Korea was 
able to successfull y follow the sequence from easy lSI to export substitution. It was 
able to reduce and overcome some of its problems through learning-by-doing. As the 
process evolved there were managerial improvements, technological adaptation, and 
improvements in human capital. The increasing share of Korea's manufacturing ex-
ports, over time, reflect the government's conscious effort to promote exports (Ams-
den, 1989; Cypher & Dietz, 2004). 
Peru also might have benefited from large amounts of development assistance over 
the past 50 years, but its social indicators are very disappointing. Although education is 
mandatory and UNESCO statistics show that 100% school enrollment has been 
achieved, the average level of education is about third grade. The imbalance of eco-
nomic growth and social development is what prompts us to label this "growth without 
development." Peru provides a textbook case of a society in which the elite has not 
been very supportive of human capital investment. As a result, Peru remains a pro-
foundly unequal society. While periods of primary-export booms generated wealth for 
a small group, these elites were resistant to reinvesting the benefits of such bonanzas 
(Moron & Sanborn, 2006). 
Korea, on the other hand, has invested in improving the quality of education. High 
quality education has improved the ability of its work force to perform effectively. 
Recent studies indicate that Korea ranks high in the level of training and performance 
of students in math and science, even higher than the United States and other devel-
oped countries. Data from the Organization of Economic Developmetn (OECD) (2011, 
p. 129) indicate that Korea ranks fifth in the world in research spending as a percentage 
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of GDP (3.36%) and is fourth in the world in the percentage of 24 year-olds with sci-
ence degrees (OECD, 2009, p. 179). See Table 3. Many economists have emphasized 
that technology is perhaps the single most important factor in generating growth and 
spreading prosperity. Most LDCs, however, lag behind and do not have the technologi-
cal capacity to increase productivity. The application of new techniques in the produc-
tion process requires engineers and a work force with proper training, but this is in 
short supply in many LDCs. 
Another explanation of Peru's underperformance is the government's failure to 
steer the economy in a more pragmatic development path by generating the proper 
incentives. Most administrations did not have a clear plan or were unable to implement 
one. Most if not all tolerated corruption, did not create an environment conducive to 
investment, maintained a judicial system that was weak and ineffective, and devoted 
little attention to developing a greater endogenous technological capacity. Peru's poor 
ratings on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (Table 2) and 
the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business (Table 2) make clear the government's fail-
ure to create a transparent, efficient system for business. 
World Bank data indicate that countries that are more corrupt have much lower per 
capita GDP. Peru's performance in this area has been much lower than Korea 's. An-
other problem is the weak judicial system, which in Peru 's case is of low quality and 
not reliable. Lawsuits can take many years to be resolved. A good legal system facili-
tates contracts and protects private parties. Finally, the ease to do business is important. 
In Peru formal businesses suffer from excessive red tape. This is one reason for the 
existence of a large "informal" sector in Peru. The World Bank estimates that in Peru 
starting a business takes 72 days and 32.5% of income per capita. This means that even 
before a business is begun, a Peruvian entrepreneur must invest extensively with gov-
ernment bureaucracy. 
Peru has the natural resources but lacks the administrative and productive capacity. 
Present and former governments have lacked organizational autonomy, have managed 
the economy poorly, and have lacked a clear long-term vision of national objectives. 
They also failed to take advantage of crucial junctures and missed opportunities when 
growth was in a boom cycle. Social inequality still hampers the electoral process, and 
therefore, democracy itself. As Moron and Sanborn (2006) note, Peru has been ham-
pered by a lack of clear objectives and the inability to implement a sustained develop-
ment approach. Peru represents a paradox. Its economy has grown for much of the last 
50 years. It has even entered an expansionary cycle for the past 15 years but has not 
experienced a full recovery in that expansionary cycle. This means that there has been 
some gain in employment opportunities and income inequality has only slightly im-
proved. Today, in many respects, it is cheaper to import than to produce domestically 
in Peru. This has, in some sense, generated a process of de-industrialization due to the 
lack of proper incentives. 
Can Peru realistically take advantage of globalization? De Rivero (200 1) recounts 
how in 1967 he represented Peru in the Kennedy Round of negotiations under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT). At the time Peru was a major producer 
of copper, lead, zinc, fishmeal, cotton, and sugar. Twenty years later as a senior diplo-
mat, he also took part in the Uruguay Round negotiations under GATT. But by then 
trade negotiations centered on manufacturers with high technology content and trade in 
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services. He notes that the content of Peru's exports had remained the same. With no 
improvement in technological development, the country was virtually left sitting on the 
sidelines of world trade negotiations. 
What are, then, the possibilities of generating a cohesive collective project aimed 
at increasing export capacity? Peru 's Ministry of Trade, for instance, was only created 
in 2002 and it is only in recent years that Peru has signed free trade agreements with 
the United States, China, and Canada. Peruvian authorities have invested more effort in 
diplomacy rather than in studying how to compete in world markets. To this day there 
is no strong desire or consensus in policy decision-making aimed at a sustained nation-
al development strategy. This is an important issue if a country like Peru is to drastical-
ly reduce poverty and become more prosperous. 
Korea vs. Peru 
Korea outperforms Peru on nearly every type of economic and social indicator. Over a 
period of three decades Korea's economy grew at a rapid pace from year to year. Its 
GDP grew from $2.3 billion in 1965 to $442 billion in 1997. Per capita income during 
this period rose exponentially (Breen, 1999). Korea's per capita GDP is now three 
times that of Peru' s. Lewis notes that "in 1970, Korea's GDP per capita was $2,500 in 
today's dollars. In 1995 , it was $12,600, or five times higher. It took the U.S. almost a 
hundred years (1857-1954) to cover the same ground" (2004, p. 105). In 2003, Korea's 
per capita GDP was over $15 ,000 (ADB, 2004) and in 2010 it had reached $29,000 
(see Table 1). Tables 3a & b, which show the United Nation' s Human Development 
Index, indicate that Korea outperforms Peru by a large margin, whether it is 
agricultural productivity, life expectancy, education, research, and development, and in 
the number of scientists and engineers. At the pace Korea was moving, it had reached 
advanced country status by 1990. In 1996, Korea joined the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation & Development (OECD), the club of high-income countries. 
Industrialization can be funded by extractive resources (mineral and agricultural), 
but resource-poor countries do not have this option, and must instead, as Ranis says, 
"shift their attention to the development of their human resources" that is, emphasize 
education and training to raise productivity ( 1996, p. 156). Korea was able to gradually 
assimilate industrial and information technologies in the 1970s and 80s, but during 
those years Peru 's economy stagnated (Ranis, 1990). The technological gap is evident 
today. Tables 3a&b show that Korea spends much more on education, research and 
development, and has an impressive number of scientists and engineers. 
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Table 3a: Human Development Indicators 
Gini Agric pro- Gross Domes- Genuine Adult Mean yrs Public 
Index ductivity per tic Investment Domestic literacy of expenditure 
worker as % ofGDP Saving as % schooling on education 
% ofGDP ($billion) 
1998 2010 1990 2010 1998 2007 2011 2009 
KOREA 31.6 19,807 38 29 25.9 1 I 1.6 5 
PERU 49.1 1,607 21 25 11.1 9 8.7 2.7 
(2009) 
Table 3b: Human Development Indicators 
Expenditure Life PCs R&D Scientists Motor HDI rank 
on health as expectancy per expenditures & Engi- vehicles 
% ofGDP 1000 as % of neers in R per 
people GDP &D 1000 
people 
2009 2000 2011 2000 2010 2007 2009 2001 2011 
KOREA 5 73 81.8 405 3.74 2,319 267 30 15 
PERU 2.7 69 74 41 0.15 239 41 80 80 
(2004) 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, various years; UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 
various years; The World Bank, 2012 
Peru and Korea were at one time engaged in an easy import substitution strategy, 
with emphasis on consumer goods geared for the domestic market. This required gov-
ernment intervention and entailed protecting infant industries, relying on overvalued 
exchange rates, and maintaining low interest rates. Lacking the resource base Korea 
was forced to export. Korea then successfully shifted toward easy export substitution, 
exporting nondurable consumer goods. Raising exports accelerated the pace of indus-
trialization. As Korean exports became more competitive it shifted to export promotion 
by exporting more sophisticated manufactured goods that had a higher content of tech-
nology, particularly in engineering and electronics. This is evident in Table 4, which 
shows the rapid growth of exports for Korea. Peru, on the other hand, tried to proceed 
from easy lSI to secondary or vertical lSI, skipping export substitution and ran into 
difficulties. 
Table 4: External Orientation Ratios (Exports/GDP in %) 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Colombia 10.9 15.7 14.6 16.3 18.9 
Peru 20.7 24 .2 19.7 22 .2 12.5 
Taiwan 10. 1 II. I 29.6 52.2 60.6 
Korea 2. 1 3 .3 14.3 37.7 40.7 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various years 
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Korea's economic success has much to do with its institutions that encouraged 
investment, the transfer of technology, industrialization, and trade. These institutions 
include educational, political, judicial, and economic systems. A critical issue for 
LDCs is how to enforce the rules for the market to operate more efficiently, ensuring 
that contracts are upheld, individual property rights enforced, and that economic trans-
actions are done in a transparent way. Without property rights there are no proper in-
centives to invest. Economists have also linked rapid economic growth to free and 
open institutions that provide the right incentives. 
Korea's Success Story 
The Korea case helps us understand how a country can emerge from a group of poor 
countries and become prosperous. During the 1960s Korea's approach was initially 
state-led leading to a strong collaboration between business and government. The state 
aggressively promoted exports through special incentives. Initially, labor-intensive 
manufacturers dominated exports but later there was industrial diversification and 
upgrading to make exports internationally more competitive (Amsden, 1989). Policy 
choices taken by Korea were properly implemented, adequately monitored, and 
achieved the desired results. In Korea subsequent administrations emphasized continui-
ty in the po licy that was central to the export-led strategy. Price stability also helped 
facilitate greater rates of saving and investment. The resulting outcome was an acceler-
ation of economic growth and an increase in labor productivity in manufacturing (Lin, 
1988). 
Korea shows that rapid catch-up can be achieved through key ingredients to propel 
growth. Aggressive trade-oriented policies and improved opportunities for investment 
were important. Korea invested one-third of its GDP to achieve high rates of growth. 
As Haggard (1990) puts it, Korea 's tum to export-led was "state-led." The state created 
the supportive measures and mechanisms to work closely with the private sector. It 
created credit incentives to exporters, provided technological assistance, and even 
marketing (Amsdem, 1989; Bradford, 1986; Singh, 1993; Song, 1997). 
The Korean government targeted "strategic" manufacturing industries. The plan 
was based on the notion that government could accelerate development by nurturing 
favored industries. In this sense, Korea has followed the Japanese model. An important 
aspect of the policy was the protection of these industries from foreign competition-
the "infant" industry argument. The protection is needed because an infant industry is 
not able to compete against imports from more developed countries. 
The success of Korea is also partly due to U.S. assistance. The Korean War in the 
early 1950s left a divided Korea. The outcome became a symbol of the Cold War. The 
United States remained committed and aimed at turning South Korea into a modern 
society based on the Western model. The United States sought success in Korea be-
cause it would prove to the world the superiority of its approach to development. Ac-
cording to Ekbladh, "by 1980, the Republic of Korea had received $6 billion in non-
military aid from the United States, and much of it during 20 years of intense effort in 
South Korea between 1948 and 1965" (2004, p. 12). The United States played a key 
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role in post-war relief and laid the foundation for nation building. Korea launched land 
reform and an industrial development strategy. 
The Vietnam War in the 1960s was a big boost for South Korea. General Park 
Chung-hee committed two divisions of troops to fight in Vietnam alongside the Ameri-
cans. The United States not only provided aid but it also awarded military contracts to 
Korean chaebols (corporate conglomerates). During the peak of the war, 94% of Kore-
an steel exports as well as a significant amount of machinery and chemicals went to the 
United States (Ekbladh, 2004). 
One factor often overlooked is that high rates of growth were achieved in a Korea 
under an authoritarian, autocratic, and centralized rule. Washington was willing to 
overlook this approach that marked succeeding regimes for three decades as long as it 
could push its own agenda. The foundation of an export-oriented economy was laid by 
the government of General Park Chung-hee, beginning with textiles and light industry. 
He was determined to promote its heavy industry (steel, automobiles , ship-building, 
and chemicals). First, he found willing partners in South Korea's business class and 
then he attracted foreign direct investment, particularly from Japan. The government 
also made strong efforts to create an attractive environment for foreign manufacturers 
that made a significant contribution to the country's export growth. All of this, in con-
junction with the appropriate economic policies, made it possible to pursue a more 
aggressive development strategy. 
By the late 60s, Korea had "graduated" and was no longer reliant on U.S. aid, 
even if Korea continued to receive economic favors from the United States in the form 
of loans and other guarantees (Stover, 1986). It was only in the 1980s that Korea 
moved to democratic rule. Korea's success is partly attributed to American aid, a 
strong authoritarian state that kept the lid on labor demands, and the extraordinary 
perseverance and initiative of the Korean people. 
Conclusion 
Productivity is a measure of efficiency in the use of capital and labor resources in the 
production process. Productivity is critical to a country's international competitiveness 
and its standard of living. Increasing productivity and efficiency can be achieved 
through human resource development by enhancing the skills and education of the 
labor force, investing in physical capital, improving management and organizational 
techniques, and upgrading the domestic technological capability. In addition, there also 
must be institutional improvements as well as the promotion of a capital market and of 
trade policies, adequate management of macroeconomic policies, and a stable 
government. 
Korea belongs to a small group of countries that have achieved spectacular success 
in expanding manufactured exports since the 1960s. Peru, on the other hand, has run 
into difficulties . Korea was able to move quickly from the simple type of manufactur-
ing to a more capital-intensive method and with greater technological content to spear-
head rapid industrialization (Amden, 1989; La! & Myint, 1996). This process was more 
difficult in Peru because of erratic political development, inappropriate macroeconomic 
policies, and weak institutions. 
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Over the past five decades Peru has lacked political continuity and the correct 
policy reforms to propel the economy to sustained growth. Explanations of Korea's 
success lie mainly on the adoption of a coherent strategy of promoting growth indus-
tries, economic and technological planning, strong support for education, investment 
incentives, industrial restructuring, and the strong push for manufactured exports. An 
important difference with a country like Peru, which experienced faltering growth, was 
macroeconomic management (Sachs, 2005 ; Lin, 1988; Ranis, 1996; Singh, 1993). This 
implies lack of macroeconomic discipline, and above all, policy continuity. Peru's 
macroeconomic pol icy shifted between strong state intervention and economic liberal-
ism depending on which government was in office. 
Explanations on Korea 's success have often emphasized its free market-oriented 
policies stressing private sector development and its outward-oriented strategy. But 
what is often overlooked is the government-led push for growth. The Korean govern-
ment implemented an lSI strategy using high levels of protection but soon switched to 
export promotion. The government assisted in the process, subsidized credit, provided 
tax incentives, and depreciated its currency. Much of Latin America, on the other hand, 
was more concerned with lSI than with export promotion. 
Other explanations stress the socio-cultural factors such as the Confucian values: 
strong work ethic, loyalty, self-discipline of the labor force, and thriftiness (Koo, 
1992). The political explanation stresses the presence of a strong autocratic state that 
provided a stable environment as well as the role of government intervention to shape 
policies. Finally, U.S. economic assistance to Korea in the form of credits and facilitat-
ing its market to Korean exports also played an important role. 
Peru's development conundrum has been its inability to maintain sustained eco-
nomic growth. Peru's economy still suffers from structural weaknesses. Peru has had 
spurts of growth but this has been mainly resource-oriented. A constant problem has 
been its enduring poverty and inequality as well as high levels of corruption. This re-
mains the main contradiction, that Peru is a country rich in natural resources but faces 
so much human misery. Various studies on development remind us that widespread 
poverty, inequality, and corruption are a drag on growth and development. In terms of 
management, many have voiced that Peru is a country without direction, no planning to 
speak of, and the government and its people seem to be "disengaged" (Schuldt, 2005). 
Sustained development bas much to do with maintaining economic discipline, creating 
the right incentives and maintaining policy continuity, generating political and judicial 
reform, having an active social policy, and promoting investor confidence. 
Peru 's economy bas remained dependent on an erratic course of traditional ex-
ports. The industrial sector has lacked competitive strength due to high costs, techno-
logical weakness, and lack of skilled labor (Sheahan, 1999). Although nontraditional 
exports have risen in recent years, the industrial sector has been slow in raising produc-
tivity and has not achieved much capacity to compete in global markets . As long as 
governments in office remain mainly concerned with short-term solutions to long-term 
problems, Peru will continue to face stumbling blocks. The country still lacks a viable 
development model and a coherent trade strategy to compete globally. Korea's success 
serves as a meaningful lesson that its path to development has much to teach about 
failed policies in countries like Peru. 
Ruben Berrios 1..: 
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